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Since Time Immemorial: The Decline of Columbia River Basin Salmon 
 
 
 Most histories of salmon in the Columbia Basin begin with a variation of 
the same line: since time immemorial, Indian people have lived and fished in the 
Columbia’s vast basin, and salmon have always been central to their culture and 
lifestyle. The specific timeline of the Columbia Basin salmon is so grand that it 
only makes this airy statement more abstract— the fishing community at Celilo 
Falls (which was inundated by The Dalles Dam in 1957) was, at more than 
10,000 years, the longest continually inhabited area in the Americas. When the 
Marmes Rockshelter—drowned under Lower Monumental Dam in 1969— on the 
lower Snake River was discovered in 1965, it contained the oldest human 
remains ever found in North America. The archaeological record supports that 
this history stretches back even farther, that the Americas’ first settlers came in 
pursuit of salmon. Today, the Pacific Northwest’s human history remains 
inseparably intertwined with the history of the salmon. As law professor Michael 
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Blumm described, without exaggeration, “Salmon remain the cultural and spiritual 
soul of the Pacific Northwest.” 1 
 The centuries-old war for that soul has been dramatic and fraught with 
blood and lies. Today, of the roughly 16 million wild salmon that once inhabited 
the Columbia Basin, only about 1% remain. 2  Since before William Clark wrote 
“The multitude of fish is almost inconceivable,” to today, when the Columbia 
salmon teeters on the edge of extinction, people have fought over the lifeblood of 
the Pacific Northwest.  
 The decline of Columbia Basin salmon, however, has not been a terraced 
and progressive fall from an Edenic native fishery. Since 1853, when the first 
treaties regarding fishing sites were signed with Native Columbia Basin 
fishermen, the loss of salmon has not been the product of momentary 
environmental misjudgments, but of systemic flaws. While the manifestations of 
this culture can be studied incrementally—unfulfilled treaty promises, 
unsustainable commercial fishing practices, dam construction, etc.— the true 
narrative of the salmon’s decline is societal. The Columbia Basin salmon has 
been brought to the edge of extinction because of a culture that has sought 
expansion for expansion’s sake and valued short-term wealth over long-term 
sustainability. This philosophy has guided and continues to guide Columbia 
                                                        
 1 Michael Blumm, Sacrificing the Salmon: A Legal and Policy History of the 
Decline of Columbia Basin Salmon (Lake Mary, FL:  BookWorld Publications , 2002) 
p. 1. 
 
 2 Anthony Netboy, The Salmon. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 
265.  
 
 
 4 
 
 
Basin fisheries management to neglect not just environmental and Native 
American considerations, but pragmatic ones as well.  
  Understanding the salmon itself is crucial to understanding the history of 
the salmon.  It is thought that salmon first evolved as freshwater fish 25-35 
million years ago. During the Great Ice Age about 1 million years ago salmon 
were separated as the Arctic ice cap grew, joining with the North American 
continent and blocking the ancient Northwest Passage. This separation yielded 
two distinct species, the Pacific Orncorhyncus (meaning hooked snout, a 
reference to the curved jaw developed by mature salmon before they spawn) and 
Atlantic Salmo. As global temperatures rose, melting ice drastically diluted the 
salinity of the oceans. Salmon, which had survived mostly in low freshwater river 
basins, were now able to venture into the less salty, nutrient rich ocean. The 
journey from freshwater into the oceans for feeding, however, was still a major 
endeavor, and was possible only to mature salmon. As a result, salmon began 
maturing in fresh water until they were physically capable of journeying to the 
ocean to feed, after which they would return to fresh water to propagate. 
Because of this process salmon became anadromous, (meaning running up) 
migrating from the ocean to freshwater to spawn.  
 The six species of salmon that have historically inhabited the Columbia 
take part in one of nature’s most spectacular migrations. Pacific salmon, 
Oncorhyncus, are born in freshwater streams. After 60 to 200 days as eggs, 
salmon fry hatch and begin maturing and hunting for food. Eventually, salmon 
swim from the gravel beds of their birth to the ocean, where they participate in an 
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expansive migration. Little is known about the specific ocean travels of the 
salmon, though some species travel more than 10,000 miles, often mingling 
(though not mating) with their relatives from Canada, Alaska, Siberia and Japan. 
After several ocean circuits over a period of about two to five years, salmon 
begin the arduous journey back to their natal streams. Though the process is not 
fully understood, it is thought that salmon use an advanced olfactory system to 
pick up on the unique chemical traits of their natal stream—after journeying 
thousands of miles over many years, salmon literally sniff their way back to the 
exact gravel bed of their birth, where they spawn and die. (Steelhead and Atlantic 
Salmon, Salmo, sometimes survive spawning and make several ocean journeys.) 
Though there are only six distinct species of Columbia salmon, these acute 
homing abilities create hundreds of genetically distinct populations. A salmon’s 
freshwater journey back to spawn alone can be up to 900 miles long, and can 
require more than a mile of elevation gain. In some locations, Salmon jump 15-
foot waterfalls as they battle their way back upstream to reproduce. 3  
 The history of the salmon’s demise begins with the first major waves of 
white settlement in the Columbia Basin in the mid-19th century. Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, A.S. Loughery, best characterized the fervor with which settlers 
pursued land when he said “No effort should be untried to procure the removal of 
[all Indians], thereby leaving the country free for settlement by the whites.” 4 
                                                        
 3 Joseph E. Taylor, Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest 
Fisheries Crisis (Seattle, WA:  University of Washington Press, 1999), 5.  
 4 Stephen Beckham, “Ethnohistorical Context of Reserved Indian Fishing 
Rights:  Pacific Northwest Treaties, 1851-1855, (no publisher, 1984, report 
prepared for United States vs. Washington, Civil No. 9213), 3. 
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While not official policy, (and in fact contradictory to federal law as, according to 
the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, all unceded land in the Oregon 
Territory belonged to Indians) Loughery’s quote became standard practice. In 
1850, Congress passed the Oregon Donation Act, which allowed 320 acres of 
land to white adult settlers in the Oregon Territory. The act, however, went into 
effect before any treaties ceding Indian land to settlers were ratified. Settlers 
asserted ownership of a total of 7,437 claims and farmed this land regardless of 
Indian ownership. In all, the act donated more than 2.8 million acres of Indian 
land to settlers before federal agents were able to negotiate treaties to make that 
land legally available. 5 
 This same trend continued with the Stevens and Palmer Treaties, a series 
of exchanges made in the mid-1850’s by Washington Territorial Governor and 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Isaac Ingalls Stevens, and Oregon Territorial 
Governor, Joel Palmer. The treaties were made in supposed good faith—in an 
exchange with Governor Stevens over one treaty, Chief Seattle remarked, “All of 
the Indians have the same good feelings towards you, and will send it on paper 
to the Great Father.” 6 As Chief Seattle’s sentiment demonstrated, the treaties 
were created under the assumption of mutual benefit. Stevens, however, 
reflected a lesser degree of goodwill—in discussing the potential consequences 
of his treaty campaign, he stated, “ere long the bones of the last of many a band 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 5 Ibid, 10. 
 
 6 As cited in Blumm, 58. 
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[of Indians] may whiten on the graves of his ancestors.” 7  In one of the largest 
land transactions in United States history, Palmer and Stevens gained roughly 64 
million acres of Indian land, much of the modern states of Oregon, Washington, 
Idaho and Montana. The Indians, left with just six million acres of reservation 
land of little value, received $1.2 million, missionaries and schools and federal 
protection of Indian lands—in justifying the new, concentrated, reservations, 
Stevens said “we can better protect you from bad white men there.”8  In reality, 
the treaties were often hollow attempts to justify massive settlement on what 
were legally Indian lands. In their drive to acquire new territory, settlers often 
invaded lands in question before treaties were ratified, leading to wars from 
1855-1858.9  In its drive for land, this first wave of white settlement in the 
Columbia Basin demonstrated clear disregard of both legal obligation and 
concern about Indian ownership of western territory. 
 As a vital cultural and economic mainstay, however, fishing rights were 
often Indians’ priority in treaty negotiations. The treaties guaranteed exclusive 
fishing rights on reservations, as well “the right of taking fish” “in common with” 
whites at customary fishing locations. 10 While negotiating the Treaty of Point No 
Point, Stevens said, (his emphasis supplied) “This paper secures your fish.” 11 
                                                        
 7 Beckham, 16. 
 
 8 Ibid, 32. 
 
 9 Taylor, 44. 
 
 10 Beckham, 69-70. 
 
 11 Blumm, 62. 
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  Beyond being a historical marker, the language of these treaties, and 
indeed their legal clout, remain relevant. For example, the Chairman of the 
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission reported in 1996 that the average 
tribal fisherman in the Columbia Basin operated at an annual loss of $7,000. 
Citing the treaties’ promise of “a right of taking fish,” interpreted by the Supreme 
Court to mean that tribal fisheries would be kept in a state adequate to preserve 
a fishing-based livelihood for Native Americans, this violation is a mainstay of the 
argument for the state’s legal obligation to sustain Columbia salmon  
populations.  
 While Native American environmental stewardship had allowed for 
significant harvests of salmon without harming populations, the economics-first 
approach to the environment that was transplanted to the Columbia Basin by 
white settlers quickly proved disastrous for salmon. As Joseph Taylor described 
of this new paradigm, “The new economic rules altered the relationship between 
consumer and nature. Aboriginal spirits no longer mediated harvests. Instead, 
settlers increasingly redefined nature as a set of commodities. They ascribed 
worth according to market values, and reorganized the landscape to produce 
marketable items.” 12  This new culture, which prioritized both geographic and 
economic expansion over environmental concern proved in the late 19th century 
and continues to prove incompatible with the salmon’s prosperity. Though Native 
American harvests of salmon were prodigious—at an average of 41 million 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 12 Taylor, 45. 
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pounds roughly equal with the highest volume white harvests of the late 19th 
century 13 — Native fishermen’s combination of environmental consciousness 
and general dispersion within the basin allowed for perpetually sustainable 
harvests. In the years immediately following the signing of the Stevens and 
Palmer treaties the combined effects of habitat degradation—through logging, 
livestock grazing, mining, irrigation, milling, and urban expansion— and the “free-
for-all mentality” that led to ruthless harvesting in concentrated areas, had 
critically reduced Columbia Basin salmon runs. In 1875, just 20 years after the 
Stevens and Palmer treaties had been signed, The Oregonian warned about the 
coming of an “almost total extinction of salmon in our waters.” 14 
 The first major degradation of the Columbia’s salmon population followed 
the introduction of the canning process to the Columbia in 1867. After its 
introduction in 1864 on California’s Sacramento River, commercial canning 
quickly reduced the river’s salmon population beyond industrial utility and to the 
brink of extinction. 15  In 1867, without consideration or change of the process 
and method that left the Sacramento River nearly devoid of salmon in just three 
years, industrial canneries transplanted northward to the Columbia where, a 
couple decades later, the same practices of unselective and concentrated 
harvesting devastated the Columbia’s salmon population. The combination of 
                                                        
 13 Joseph Craig; Robert Hacker, The History and Development of the Fisheries 
of the Columbia River, US Bureau of Fisheries Bulletin 32, (Washington D.C., 
Government Printing Office, 1940.)  
 
 14 “Fish Culture,” The Portland Morning Oregonian, XV:91 (May 21, 1875), 3.  
 15 Anthony Netboy, The Salmon, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 
235. 
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growing markets in Europe and on the East Coast, as well as the completion of a 
transcontinental railroad, caused production to soar. By 1890, the population of 
Columbia salmon was reduced by half. While cannery harvests were not 
significantly greater than Native harvests—43 million pounds at their peak in 
1883 versus the native average of 41 million pounds 16 — canneries’ use of 
unselective fishing practices concentrated in a relatively small stretch of water 
made the practice unsustainable. Again, however, rather than refining their 
practices, canneries refined their technology for increased efficiency and moved 
northward toward the Puget Sound.  
 State attempts at regulation during this period were either weak and 
toothless or were direct attempts to bolster white expansion at the expense of 
natives. Either way, they failed to impact plummeting salmon populations and 
perpetuated unsustainable harvests and practices. Washington’s first feeble 
attempt at protecting the salmon began in 1871 with a ban on weirs (fish traps) 
and nets that blocked more than 2/3 of a water source’s flow. This act was 
followed in 1877 and 1878 in Washington and Oregon, respectively, by bans on 
fishing for certain months out of year, and in Oregon regulation of the placement 
and design of nets and traps. The states’ laws failed to coordinate with one 
another or with industry— there were no restrictions placed on shipping or 
railroads’ ability to transport salmon during closed seasons. Coupled with near 
non-existent enforcement—Oregon had a single enforcement officer for the 
entire length of the Columbia—state regulation was a failure. In Washington, 
                                                        
 16 Craig, Hacker.  
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laws guised as preservation measures benefitted white fishermen at Native 
American expense. Washington established “salmon preserves” on numerous 
freshwater sites, many of which were traditional Native fishing grounds. 
Meanwhile, no restrictions were placed on saltwater fishing, where motor boats 
and gill netting yielded white fishermen prodigious harvests. 17 As Michael Blumm 
described, “the preserves foisted the burden of salmon conservation on the 
tribes, while allowing white fisheries in the [Puget] sound and ocean to continue 
largely unrestrained.” 18  In what Charles Wilkinson has characterized as a 
“frenzied free-for-all,” 19 the late 19th and early 20th centuries were a period of 
unsustainable and unfettered harvests. 
  As their right to sustainable fisheries became critically threatened, tribes 
turned to the federal courts to uphold the guarantees of the first treaties. Almost 
immediately after the signing of the Stevens and Palmer treaties, conflict arose at 
Celilo Falls. After several attempts by whites to exclude natives from the 
treasured site, in 1895 the Office of Indian Affairs, together with the Department 
of Justice, went to court in order to reestablish tribes’ legal right to fish at Celilo 
Falls and throughout the region. The case was the response to the Winans 
Brothers Packing Company, which operated four fish wheels (mills that scooped 
fish out of the water, day and night) on the Washington side at Celilo. Winans 
                                                        
 17 Netboy, 19-20. 
 
 18 Blumm, 6. 
 
 19 Charles F. Wilkinson Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the 
Future of the West (Washington, D.C.:  Island Press, 1992) 188.  
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held federal homestead patents to the area and, despite the Indian right to fish 
“in common with whites” at traditional sites, fenced off the area, destroying Indian 
curing huts in the process. The ruling by state court favored Winans: according to 
Judge C.H. Hanford Indians were guaranteed only a right to equal treatment as 
whites through the treaties, and had no special rights to the property.  Winans 
responded by building new fences. 20 
 In 1905, the case United States v. Winans, moved to the US Supreme 
Court where, in a major foundational opinion for tribal fishing rights Justice 
Joseph McKenna reversed Washington’s decision. According to McKenna, the 
treaty clearly promised the Indians a greater right to fisheries than equality with 
whites.  In granting Indians “equal” rights, Washington violated the treaties, which 
“promise[d] more and [gave] the word of the nation for more.” McKenna 
concluded: 
The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a part 
of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of 
which there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not 
much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the 
atmosphere they breathed. New conditions came into existence, 
to which those rights had to be accommodated. Only a limitation 
of them, however, was necessary and intended, not a taking 
away. 21 
 
 The decision was significant in establishing the supremacy of treaty 
rights— private land titles, like those of the Winans, as well as all pertinent state 
legislature, became legally subordinate to treaty guarantees. Though the 
decision is celebrated today as a landmark victory for tribal fishing rights, 
                                                        
 20 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 1905 
 21 Ibid.  
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McKenna’s statement about limitation later became a justification for state 
regulation of treaty rights, which proved a source of conflict for decades to come. 
While treaty rights to plentiful fish harvest and access to traditional fishing 
grounds were upheld legally, however, they were seldom upheld practically—
legality proved an insufficient obstacle to halt the expansion that was killing the 
salmon. In the following decades, fish populations would continue to dwindle as 
Natives increasingly saw their traditional sites drowned by dams. The era of 
industrial canning reflects the same mentality that ignited white settlement in the 
Columbia Basin, and illustrates why that culture of unfettered growth was 
impossible to sustain along with healthy salmon populations. It also reflects the 
pragmatic, legal, and environmental fallacies of such a culture—in their 
unfettered drive for economic gain, industrial canners ruined in twenty years what 
had been a sustainable resource for 10,000, a sustainable resource they were 
legally obligated to sustain.  
 Salmon populations during the first decades of the 20th century continued 
to decline. Regulation was not science-based, emphasized overfishing, and 
ignored how destruction of salmon habitat adversely affected populations.  
Meanwhile, the effects of growing industry and population continued to devastate 
the population. Livestock, mining, timber harvesting, agriculture and urban 
growth silted spawning beds, drained marshes and wetlands, and polluted water 
sources.  The alteration of the course, temperature, oxygen levels and 
cleanliness of salmon-supporting waterways that accompanied development was 
as detrimental a force against the salmon as unselective and concentrated 
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harvests. But these impacts were unheeded by proponents of expansion.  As 
salmon habitats from British Columbia to the Sacramento River fell to industry 
and growth, so did the fish they supported. 22 
 In 1932, the Army Corps of Engineers created its 308 report, which 
outlined the construction of ten dams for better navigation, flood control, and 
cheap hydropower, but contained no mention of impact on fish and wildlife, the 
era of massive dam building which lasted from the Great Depression to the mid-
1970’s proved most devastating to Columbia basin salmon. Beginning in 1933 
with the construction of Rock Island Dam on the Columbia near Wenatchee, 
Washington, the federal government began constructing massive dams between 
Washington’s Grand Coulee and Oregon’s Bonneville Dam as part of New Deal 
job creation programs. In a retrospective 1948 report on development of the 
Columbia and its tributaries, the Corps of Engineers stated, “…only in a few 
instances has any thought been paid to the effect these developments might 
have had on fish and wildlife.” 23 The attitude and culture that allowed this 
oversight is best captured by the Chief of the Corps who in response to inquiries 
about fish ladders on the Bonneville Dam is reported to have said “We do not 
intend to play nursemaid to the fish!”  24  Had the fishing industry and public’s 
protests not prevailed, the entire population of salmon spawning in the thousands 
of miles of waterways above Bonneville would have become extinct. Even when 
                                                        
 22 Taylor, 143.  
 23 Corps of Engineers, Columbia River and Tributaries, House Doc. 531, 81st 
Congress, 2nd Session, Volume VII, 2863 
 
 24 Netboy, 287. 
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consideration was given to fish populations during dam construction, as it 
eventually was at Bonneville, protective measures were often inadequate. While 
fish ladders at the hydroelectric Bonneville and Rock Island dams granted 
passage to some mature salmon returning from the ocean, they failed to 
accommodate those heading out to sea. As a result, an unsustainable 15% of 
juvenile salmon traveling downstream were killed on average at each dam. This 
number was presented in reports from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
beginning with the completion of Bonneville in 1938, yet failed to figure into the 
Corps’ continued construction of hydroelectric and navigational dams. Some 
dams sealed off the river completely. With the completion of the Grand Coulee 
dam, for example, the Columbia was cut off from its headwaters in British 
Columbia. As a result, all salmon populations spawning above the dam were 
killed, including the famed June Hog run, a Chinook population in which 
individual fish averaged above 80 pounds.  
 Some of the most devastating impacts of dam construction were unknown 
and thus not considered during dam construction. For example, we now 
understand that heavy spills of water over dams results in nitrogen 
supersaturation in reservoirs, one of the deadliest consequences of dam 
construction. This change in chemistry causes “bubble disease,” which annually 
takes millions of salmon. Reservoirs also harmed salmon spawning downstream 
by altering the river’s flow. The spring freshets that salmon required for passage 
to and from the ocean were stored in the reservoir for use in later, drier seasons, 
making even more difficult, and thus increasing the mortality rate, for migrating 
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salmon. For example, while it took only 14 days for a salmon to travel from The 
Dalles to the mouth of the Snake River before dam construction, it now requires 
a 22-day journey. The high temperature that result from slack water in reservoirs 
have led to increased populations of juvenile salmon predators and have 
contributed to outbreaks of fatal disease. 25 
 Dam building increased following World War II, as the result of an influx of 
population and a growth of industry throughout the Pacific Northwest. Dam 
projects primarily provided jobs for returning soldiers. They also provided an 
economic boon, supplying low cost irrigation for agriculture, low cost hydropower 
for industry and civilians, and opened shipping channels as far inwards as 
Lewiston, Idaho.  
 The era came to a close in 1975, by which point about 60 dams had been 
built within the Columbia basin. The last four dams were built on the Lower 
Snake River. Construction of the dams was initially rejected by Congress in 
1953, based on the likelihood of extinction for salmon spawning above the dams 
that would follow their completion. In 1955, however, lobbying by the aluminum 
industry, power and other utility companies, various chambers of commerce, 
shipping and other navigation dependent industries, agriculture, and 
newspapers, as well as a changing Congress, secured funds for the construction 
of the dams, beginning with Ice Harbor Dam. The construction of these dams 
was not passive or uninformed—it reflects a conscious decision to expand 
                                                        
 25 Howard Raymond, Migration Rates of Yearling Chinook Salmon in Relation 
to Flows and Impoundments in the Columbia and Snake Rivers, Washington 
Department of Fisheries, 1968 
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industry at the expense of anadromous fish in the Snake. Based on the 
information yielded by decades of dam construction, as well as basic reasoning, 
Congress and industry were aware of the devastation that dam construction 
entailed for the salmon— in initially rejecting construction, Chairman of the 
House Appropriations Committee Clarence Cannon of Missouri stated: “The 
construction of this dam means eventually the complete extinction of a species of 
salmon which thereafter can never be resuscitated or recreated.” 26  
 Concerns about the four dams’ impact on Snake River salmon proved well 
founded. After their completion, the survival rate for juvenile salmon migrating 
downstream on the Lower Snake plunged from 95% to 25%. In 1988, Snake 
River Coho went extinct. Two years later, a single sockeye salmon returned to 
Idaho. In 1994, the Snake River Chinook was listed on the endangered species 
list. The Snake River Dams, however, make a relatively small economic 
contribution—they provide no flood control, little irrigation and only 5% of the 
Northwest’s power. Their most significant contribution is allowing shipping to 
inland ports, despite heavy subsidies on barge transportation. 27 Construction of 
the four dams on the Lower Salmon River reflects the collective choice to 
prioritize the expansion of hydropower and inland shipping despite the known 
and devastating consequences on salmon.  
                                                        
 26 Hearing Before the Subcommitee of the Committee of Appropriations, House 
of Representatives, 82nd Congress, 2nd session, Part 2, 879. 
 
 27 Columbia River System Operation Review Impact Statement, (GPO: US Army 
Corps of Engineers, November, 1995) Sections 3-3, 5-1, and 5-2. 
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 Rather than addressing dam construction, overfishing or habitat 
degradation, artificial propagation through hatchery programs became the 
popular response to declining salmon populations. First introduced to the 
Columbia basin in 1877, by the turn of the century hatchery construction and 
propagation had exploded. Though the method has yet to be retired today, 
hatcheries were quickly proven as an ineffective compensation for wild fish.  
Lacking the genetic diversity of wild fish, hatchery fish were more susceptible to 
deadly diseases and often spread them to wild fish as well. The stronger and 
older hatchery fish also competed with wild fish for resources and diluted the 
genetic distinctness of individual populations through interbreeding. By 1935, 
salmon harvests in Washington fell to 15 million pounds, a 300% decline from the 
turn of the century, despite an increased hatchery production from 25 to 90 
million fish during that same period. 28 
 Despite these clear indicators about their economic ineffectiveness, 
hatchery production continued to explode into the dam-building era. Bolstered by 
the 1938 Mitchell Act, which over 50 years granted roughly $200 million in federal 
funding for hatchery programs to compensate for fish lost in dam operations, 
belief in the effectiveness of hatchery programs was perpetuated by the 
supposition that they were an adequate means of sustaining salmon runs, and 
thus the salmon industry, while growing hydroelectric power sources and 
increasing flood control and inland navigation. The introduction over the next 50 
                                                        
 28 William Dietrich. Northwest Passage: The Great Columbia River (New York 
City: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 337. 
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years of forty new hatcheries was guided by this philosophy, and reflects its 
flaws. The majority of these new projects were built below the Bonneville Dam, 
which, while ideal for skirting dam-related death rates, concentrated fish in the 
river’s lower extremes, away from tribal fisherman. This concentration also 
encouraged ocean salmon fishing, which was unselective and often harvested 
disproportionate numbers of wild fish compared to those that were introduced 
artificially. 29 The issues related to hatchery-produced fish that were discovered 
decades earlier were perpetuated and became clearer during this period as well. 
That hatchery fish diluted unique gene pools, spread disease and competed for 
resources suggested that they covered up and contributed to the decline of 
Columbia Basin salmon, rather than solved it. Refusal to cease the use of 
hatcheries in the Columbia Basin despite their cost and the danger we know they 
pose to wild populations reflects the same choice that is made in erecting dams. 
 Later initiatives like the Northwest Power Act, the Pacific Salmon Treaty 
and Endangered Species Act all were direct responses to dangerously reduced 
populations. While freshwater issues like dam building and habitat degradation 
posed an obvious threat to salmon populations, obstacles during their ocean 
journeys were similarly harmful. A salmon’s ocean journey is difficult to 
understand and follow, and even more difficult to protect. In their migration, 
salmon cross international waterways, passing through the jurisdictions of 
Canada, Japan, Russia, and other nations. As a result, Columbia basin salmon 
are frequently intercepted by foreign nations, who bear none of the costs or 
                                                        
 29 Ibid, 381. 
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consequences of Columbia basin salmon conservation, but reap financial benefit. 
The issue is further complicated by fisheries in Alaska: in order to compensate 
for fish lost to Alaskan fishing, Canadians harvested US salmon, meaning those 
from both Alaskan and Columbia basin sources. This international 
interdependency prompted the creation of the Pacific Salmon Treaty.  
 By the early 1980’s, west coast Chinook populations were being seriously 
threatened by interceptions, which were an impetus to moving negotiations along 
and eventually producing the 1985 treaty. The treaty emphasized equitable 
harvest allocation and conservation, meaning that nations were entitled to 
“benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters,” and 
similarly that all would not overfish. Difficulties in implementation became 
apparent immediately—vague language like “equitable harvests,” and 
noncommittal pledges left the treaty without teeth, leading to international 
gridlock. After nearly a decade of negotiation, in 1999 amendments were made 
to more pragmatically govern harvests by basing them on current fish 
populations. Because the original did not accommodate for species variation, 
however, weak populations were more susceptible to damage. While the 1999 
amendments were improvements, they have yet to prove effective, as vague 
wording and perceived unfair harvest restrictions, as well as ineffective measures 
for habitat protection have hindered successful implementation.  
 Industrialized nations do not need to abuse their salmon resources to 
promote growth. That the management of Columbia Basin fisheries has been 
guided by unrestricted expansion becomes clear by comparing it to British 
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Columbia’s Fraser River Basin. The Fraser, which has surpassed the Columbia 
as the world’s largest salmon population, and Columbia Basins are similar 
waterways—they must support industrial and tribal fishing, they pass through 
significant urban areas (the Fraser through Vancouver B.C.), they have 
enormous hydroelectric potential and they both have suffered the consequences 
of industrialization and resource extraction. It is not, therefore, for lack of 
environmental obstacles that Fraser salmon thrive while Columbia salmon near 
extinction, but for cultural choice.  The inhabitants of the Fraser Basin have 
chosen to prioritize the survival of salmon. The Fraser underwent a similar 
transformation as the Columbia at the turn of the century: a growing population, 
combined with bountiful natural resources, led to habitat degradation and 
unsustainable harvests. In one case, railroad construction at a canyon known as 
Hell’s Gate blocked off the main stem of the river almost entirely. Understanding 
that progress did not necessitate ruthless exploitation of natural resources, and 
prioritizing the continued existence of the salmon, the Canadian government was 
able to take meaningful action to preserve both industry and salmon. The 
management of the Fraser placed restrictions on logging, mining, and industrial 
pollution, and pushed environmental restoration while also refusing to allow the 
construction of dams despite the waterway’s hydroelectric potential. In 1971, 
Pacific Area Director on the Department of Fisheries Rob Hourston stated that 
“despite increasing catches by commercial fishermen, stiff regulations in some 
seasons and the recent complaints concerning threats to spawning grounds by 
industry and land settlement, British Columbia’s salmon resources have 
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increased by 13% during the past decade.” 30 This success was the result of a 
culture that prioritized the continued existence of the salmon and understood 
that, in promoting sustainability, restriction could be a proponent of progress. 
While the management of the Columbia refused to curb expansion, choosing to 
push development and haphazardly compensate with hatchery programs, 
management of the Fraser sought balance. When compared to the Fraser River, 
the continued use of hatcheries, the construction of dams, unsustainable and 
unselective harvests and degradation of habitat in the Columbia Basin reflect a 
refusal to restrict expansion despite the devastating impact on  
salmon. 31  
 In concluding his book on dams on the Lower Snake River, Keith Petersen 
wrote of our efforts to save the salmon, “We have not really sacrificed at all. We 
paid for all those fish salvage efforts while continuing to enjoy the cheapest 
electricity in the nation, while continuing to support, at little personal expense, a 
huge toll free waterway. We have not even begun to make the regional lifestyle 
changes that might actually be required to save these fish.” 32 By interchanging 
“cheap electricity” and “toll free waterways” with free land, or industrial canning, 
or grazing or timber or any other kind of profitable land, that statement can apply 
to all generations since white men first came to the Oregon Territory. This 
generation is not unique in refusing the consequences of its actions. It is instead 
                                                        
 30 National Fisherman, (August 1971). As cited in Netboy, 389. 
 31 Netboy, 367-390.  
 
 32 Keith C. Petersen, River of Life, Channel of Death: Fish and Dams on the 
Lower Snake (Lewiston, ID: Confluence Press, Inc., 1995), 230. 
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only the most recent manifestation of a culture that prioritizes growth—economic, 
geographic, or otherwise—above all else, and fails to understand sustainability 
as a factor of progress. For the inhabitants of the Columbia Basin, the history of 
the salmon has proven that drive more powerful than concern for the 
environment, for our legal and moral obligations to Native Americans, and even 
to our pragmatic interests.  
  
 
  
 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRPAHY  
 
Beckham, Stephen, “Ethnohistorical Context of Reserved Indian Fishing Rights:  
 Pacific Northwest Treaties, 1851-1855. no publisher, 1984, report prepared 
 for United States vs. Washington, Civil No. 9213. 
 
Blumm, Michael, Sacrificing the Salmon: A Legal and Policy History of the Decline of 
 Columbia Basin Salmon. Lake Mary, FL:  BookWorld Publications , 2002. 
 
Columbia River System Operation Review Impact Statement, (GPO: US Army Corps of 
 Engineers, November, 1995) 
 
Corps of Engineers, Columbia River and Tributaries, House Doc. 531, 81st Congress, 
 2nd Session, Volume VII, 2863 
 
Craig, Joseph; Hacker, Robert, The History and Development of the Fisheries of the 
 Columbia River, US Bureau of Fisheries Bulletin 32. Washington D.C., 
 Government Printing Office, 1940.  
 
Deloria, Vine Jr., Indians of the Pacific Northwest: From the Coming of White Man to 
 the Present Day. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 2012. 
 
Dietrich, William, Northwest Passage: The Great Columbia River. New York City: 
 Simon and Schuster, 1995. 
 
“Fish Culture,” The Portland Morning Oregonian, XV:91 (May 21, 1875) 
 
Hearing Before the Subcommitee of the Committee of Appropriations, House of 
 Representatives, 82nd Congress, 2nd session 
 
Netboy, Anthony, The Salmon. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974. 
 
Petersen, Keith C., River of Life, Channel of Death: Fish and Dams on the Lower Snake. 
Lewiston, ID: Confluence Press, Inc., 1995. 
 
“A River of Broken Promises,” The Oregonian, 166:55,908 (March 13, 2016) 
 
Robbins, William G., Landscapes of Conflict: The Oregon Story, 1940-2000.  Seattle, 
 WA: University of Washington Press, 2004. 
 
Taylor, Joseph E.  Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest 
 Fisheries Crisis Seattle, WA:  University of Washington Press, 1999.  
 25 
 
 
 
Ulrich, Roberta, Empty Nets: Indians, Dams, and the Columbia River. Corvallis: Oregon 
 State University Press, 2007.  
 
Howard Raymond, Migration Rates of Yearling Chinook Salmon in Relation to Flows 
 and Impoundments in the Columbia and Snake Rivers, Washington 
 Department of Fisheries, 1968. 
 
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 1905 
 
Wilkinson, Charles F., Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future of the 
 West. Washington, D.C.:  Island Press, 1992. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
